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Abstract 
Cryptomarkets are online marketplaces that are part of the Dark Web and mainly devoted to the 
sale of illicit drugs. They combine tools to ensure anonymity of participants with the delivery 
of products by mail to enable the development of illicit drug trafficking.  
Using data collected on eight cryptomarkets, this study provides an overview of the Canadian 
illicit drug market. It seeks to inform about the most prevalent illicit drugs vendors offer for 
sale and the preferred destination countries. Moreover, the research gives an insight into the 
structure and organisation of distribution networks existing online. We inform on the number 
of listings each vendor manages, the number of cryptomarkets they are active on and the 
products they sell in function of their presence on them.  
This research demonstrates the importance of online marketplaces in the illicit drug markets. It 
shows how the analysis of data available online may elicit knowledge on criminal activities. 
Such knowledge is mandatory to design efficient policy for monitoring or repressive purposes.  
 
Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
Cryptomarkets are defined as a type of website that employs advanced encryption to protect the 
anonymity of users and that have been launched by entrepreneurs since a few years to increase 
the security of virtual illicit markets [1]. They are part of the Dark Web (a small part of the 
Deep Web) and propose a wide range of illegal products, mainly illicit drugs, which are shipped 
by post. They share many structural features with popular marketplaces such as eBay or 
Amazon, with searchable listings of products for sale and buyers being able to leave feedback 
on their purchases. These online markets use the virtually untraceable cryptocurrency bitcoin, 
The Onion Router (TOR) service and the encryption of private messages, files and e-mails using 
the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) cryptosystem to ensure anonymity of both administrators and 
participants [1-4]. These technologies and the delivery of products by mail have significantly 
decreased the monitoring and detection abilities of law enforcement agencies. Moreover, these 
tools combined with an escrow system have significantly changed the structure and organisation 
of illicit drug trafficking. This phenomenon is characterised as a revolution and a criminal 
evolution in drug trading [5, 6]. 
Works evaluated the impact of such marketplaces on consumers and vendors as well as the 
spread of this trafficking. In particular, studies focussed on Silk Road, the first cryptomarket to 
appear at the beginning of 2011 [1, 5-13]. Researchers first characterised Silk Road as an “eBay 
for Drugs” with drug consumers making personal use-sized purchases and described 
transactions as ‘business-to-customers’ [1-3]. Instead, a study showed that a significant 
proportion of transactions on Silk Road was best characterised as ‘business-to-business’, with 
sales in quantities and at prices typical of purchases made by dealers sourcing stock [6]. Just 
before its closure, more than 1000 vendors were active on Silk Road and annual sales were 
estimated at 89.7 millions USD [6]. United-States was the most frequent country of origin of 
vendors and sellers proposed to ship their illicit products mostly worldwide [3]. While 
cryptomarkets contribute little to the global illicit drug trade, more than 50% of drug consumers 
in Australia, England and United-States know they exist and about 15% of them have performed 
at least one transaction [12].  
Cryptomarkets show benefits for both vendors (security, worldwide market) and consumers 
(diversity in the kind of available drugs, the information related to products and vendors, the 
quality of products, security) compared to traditional market [10-12]. At the time of writing, 
about 20 cryptomarkets are active. This illustrates the strong demand for this kind of 
marketplace as well as the growing importance of cryptomarkets in the trafficking of illicit 
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products. It seems unlikely that cryptomarkets are going to disappear, in spite of law 
enforcement crackdowns [6]. 
Thus, this research aims at gaining knowledge on these marketplaces. In particular, the study 
investigates the structure and organisation of the illicit drug trafficking from a Canadian 
perspective. Data were collected in 2014 from eight cryptomarkets and consist in 3685 listings 
and about 200 vendor profiles from Canada.  
 
2. Material and methods 
Listings and vendor profiles present on eight cryptomarkets were indexed and collected 
between August and September 2014 using a web crawler. Each listing had its own webpage 
that contained a title (drug name and quantity), description, product category, price, vendor 
identification number, shipping country, shipping destinations and postage options. Feedback 
from past customers on both product and vendor is available for consultation (see Figure 1). 
Each vendor also had his own profile page, which contained the registration date, a personal 
description, his public PGP key, a metric related to feedback (i.e. good/bad reputation), and the 
number of past transactions. Since our study aims at analysing the Canadian illicit drug market 
on Darknet, only listings and vendors from Canada were considered. Thus, our dataset 
contained 3685 listings and 198 vendor profiles.  
In this paper, we first provide an overview of the Canadian drug market with information such 
as the types of illicit drugs on sale and the destination countries. Then, we investigate how the 
online market is structured and organised through a combined analysis of usernames and their 
public PGP keys. PGP is an encryption protocol that allows anyone to encrypt a message in a 
way that ensures that only the recipient can decrypt the data [4]. It involves from the participants 
the sharing of their respective public PGP keys and they serve as an important identity-
verification tool between users [14]. Thus, the analysis of PGP keys may confirm the 
membership of similar usernames to the same distribution network and also reveal the existence 
of relationships between different usernames. 
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Figure 1. Example of a listing with collected information in red  
(screenshot of the cryptomarket Evolution) 
 
3. Overview of the illicit drug trafficking 
The Canadian market seems to contribute little to the global drug trade on Darknet in terms of 
listings originating from Canada as the drug listings originating from Canada represented only 
6% of the respective total number of listings on Silk Road [3].  
According to our dataset, Agora, Silk Road 2 and Evolution are the three main cryptomarkets 
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Cryptomarkets Number of vendors Number of listings 
Agora 57 1109 
Evolution 44 691 
Silk Road 2 36 748 
Cloud-nine 27 395 
Pandora 18 398 
Hydra 8 79 
Andromeda 5 149 
Blue sky 3 116 
Total 198 3685 
 
Table 1. Number of vendor names and listings originating from Canada on the eight cryptomarkets 
 
Cannabis (mainly weed/marijuana but also resin, concentrates, etc.) is largely proposed, 
followed by products sold as Ecstasy, Psychedelics and Stimulants (see Table 2). Ecstasy, MDA 
and MDMA are mainly proposed as Ecstasy. Substances particularly mentioned in the category 
Stimulants are cocaine, speed/methamphetamine and amphetamine; more rarely are ephedrine, 
ephedrine, methylone and MDVP. Psychedelic comprises mostly substances such as LSD 
blotters/crystal, mushrooms, mescaline, dissociatives (mainly GHB and ketamine) and 
Research Chemicals. While heroin is principally present in the category Opioids, fentanyl, 
hydromorphone and oxycodone are also proposed. 2906 listings concern these types of drugs, 
which represent about 80% of the total number of drug listings collected on the eight 
cryptomarkets (n = 3685). 
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Category Number of listings 
Percentage 
(n = 3685) 
Cannabis 1334 36 
Ecstasy 549 15 
Psychedelics 428 12 
Stimulants 410 11 
Opioids 185 5 
 
Table 2. Number of listings and proportions per category of illicit drug1 
 
Canadian vendors propose to ship illicit products mainly all over the world, as illustrated by 
Table 3. Such information does not enable us to infer the precise country the illicit drug may be 
sent to but reveals the capability of vendors to handle worldwide shipping. They are not 
reluctant to ship illicit drugs across borders. This may be explained by the techniques used by 
sellers to make interception of mails unlikely – e.g., vacuum sealing, “professional-looking” 
envelops with typed destination addresses. Since some vendors also asked to be paid at the time 
of the transaction, shipping drugs worldwide represents a relatively low risk for them [3].  
Canada, United-States or both of them are the only possible destinations of a few listings. These 
are thus described as domestic shipments, which have low chances to be seized by law 
enforcement authorities, according to vendors’ statements on their profiles. Lastly, it is worth 
noting the presence of listings not to be intended for Australia, since this country implemented 
efficient methodologies to control importations of illicit products by post [15]. 
  
                                                             
1 There were a number of additional categories under which drugs were sold on each of the eight marketplaces 
that we do not present in our tables, because the substances involved were not illegal: other (n = 143), 
paraphernalia (n = 1), prescription (n = 197), steroids (n = 6), supplements (n = 1), undefined (n = 390) and weight 
loss (n=3). 
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Destination Number of listings 
Percentage 
(n = 2906*) 
Worldwide 1801 62 
Domestic 388 13 
Information not available 367 13 
List of countries 311 11 
Worldwide except Australia 17 < 1 
Worldwide except Domestic 22 < 1 
 
Table 3. Destinations of the shipments as mentioned by the vendors (* : number of listings concerning cannabis, 
ecstasy, psychedelics, stimulants and opioids) 
 
4. Structure of the trafficking 
 
a. Analysing vendor names 
136 unique usernames were identified (names were considered different even when only the 
case was different). Most of the Canadian vendors manage less than ten listings each (69 
vendors, representing 47 % of the total number of vendors, see Figure 2). This is probably 
because of the difficulty of managing several listings at the same time (that may concern 
different types of illicit drugs), since customers may order the same listing more than once. 
Therefore, each vendor has to manage its supply and the orders. However, some vendors 
propose a relatively high number of products. For instance, five vendors possess more than 100 
listings each. This observation may reveal that they play a major role in the illicit drug 
trafficking. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of the number of listings for each vendor 
 
A complementary way to evaluate which vendors may be important actors of the trafficking 
consists in studying the structure of their illicit activity (i.e. their presence on one or several 
markets). When based on vendor names, this analysis reveals that most of the vendors (114, 
about 80% of the total number of vendors) focus their activity on only one market (Figure 3). 
Furthermore, their presence on several cryptomarkets at the same time decreases when the 
number of cryptomarkets increases. Nevertheless, some vendors do operate on several markets. 
They may be thus defined as important actors of drug trafficking compared to vendors focussing 
on the same cryptomarket. This is especially true since vendors present on several 
cryptomarkets usually manage a high number of listings: the number of listings of a vendor is 
correlated to the number of markets where he is present (correlation of 0.6, p-value < 10-16). 
For instance, 17 vendors are present from 3 to 6 markets. The number of listings each of them 
manages varies between 19 and 438. The minimum of this range is relatively high according to 
Figure 2 (see above). 
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Figure 3. Occurrence of vendor names and PGP keys on one or several cryptomarkets 
 
b. Analysing PGP keys 
It is worth noting that the results obtained through the analysis of usernames are uncertain. 
Indeed, presence of similar vendor names on different marketplaces does not mean they are part 
of the same distribution network. Moreover, the semantically or phonetically similarity between 
virtual usernames may not be a relevant indicator of their use by the same people/organisation. 
For instance, on Andromeda a vendor named Cannabisking says in his profile: “WE ARE NOT 
ASSOCIATED WITH CANNABISKING FROM CLOUD-NINE. WE ARE CANNABISKING 
EVERYWHERE ELSE. ON CLOUD-NINE WE ARE CANNABISKINGS”. The analysis of the 
public PGP key associated with each vendor provides meaningful information to address such 
issue. Since the key serves as an authentication tool between participants, this analysis 
objectifies the determination of the structure of the online market and makes less uncertain the 
characterisation of distribution networks (see Material and methods). Thus, a vendor mentions 
on Evolution that (quotations underlined by authors): “Also I have hear someone was 
pretending to be me on Cannabis Road so always verify its really me with my PGP […] I 
NEVER CHANGE MY PGP FROM WHATEVER SITE IM ON”. Likewise, another one states: 
”Formerly BCBUDking on Silk Road and MarijuanaMan39 on Atlantis, BCBUDKING on BMR, 
Sheepmarket and TORMarket - Pandora  - My PGP has not changed it is still me!”. Lastly, 
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another vendor named TessellatedMDMA mentions on his profile: ”We are the same vendor 
as "Tessellated". This is the account we sell our MDMA on.  You can confirm we are the same 
because we are both using the same PGP key and this message is signed with that key”.  
The combined analysis of vendor names and public PGP keys shows that 89% of usernames 
are associated with only one key and 83% of keys are associated with only one username. This 
shows that vendors generally use one and only one public PGP key. Conversely, one key is 
mostly associated with one and only one username. It is worth noting that most of the vendors 
are present on only one cryptomarket (see Figure 3), which may partly explain these high 
percentages. Nevertheless, these results illustrate the individual character of the association 
username - public PGP key. A few keys are associated with usernames that are different (14% 
of PGP keys are related to two different names, 2% to three different names). In other words, 
different usernames/seller accounts are using the same PGP key. Most of these seller accounts 
are active on different cryptomarkets, even though two keys are found to be respectively 
associated with two vendors on the same cryptomarket. This is not an attractive approach, as 
there is a fee associated with opening a seller account [3]. However, by ensuring their presence 
on several cryptomarkets, sellers may reach more customers and increase their income. In a few 
words, illicit drug trafficking on Darknet is therefore more structured than we would have 
thought through the analysis of vendor names.  
Indeed ou morever, The analysis of public PGP keys shows that for the most part usernames 
used by a same distribution network are quite similar, with names differing only from the case 
or addition of a word (see the names associated with P2, P4, P5, P6 and P8 in Table 4). This 
makes sense as the vendor sells commodity and relies on repeat custom, sometimes interacting 
with the same people. The reputation and the name of a vendor are strongly connected. When 
you have reached good reputation, you will keep your username since it vouches for the quality 
of the commodity you sell. For instance, a vendor named Straightbiz mentions in his profile 
“You can find me on Silk Road & Agora under the same vendor name I have great feedbacks 
(perfect 5/5 so far which took me months of honest selling)“. Thus, reputation and username 
play a major role regarding income. In the drugs cryptomarket era, having good customer 
service and a good reputation via feedback are important assets to the success of distribution 
networks [6]. 
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Public PGP keys also reveal relationships between vendors that were uncertain or not suspected 
because of differences in their usernames (see especially P1 and P9 in Table 4). These results 
confirm the information provided by vendors on their profiles. For instance, on the profile of 
Scaptain we read “[...] NEW OWNER--- TOMORROWMAN!! Purchased this account on april 
17th. Identity can be verified by my pgp”. Likewise, MeGrimlock and skeletor (P9) use exactly 
the same words in the description of their profiles. Usernames associated by P2 (see Table 4) 
all mention to be part of the “Going Postal Group”. On the cryptomarket Pandora the vendor 
associated with P8 clearly says he is ”Currently on AGORA, Blue Sky and 
Pandora(medicineman420) and SR2(medicine420)” and vendors associated with P4 refer to 
the same e-mail address in the description of their profiles. Lastly, BCBUDking and 
Tessellated/TessellatedMDMA are also linked through their respective keys, confirming their 
statements on their profiles (see the first paragraph of this section).  
 
PGP Key 
Number of cryptomarkets where  
the PGP key has been used 
Vendor names associated with 
the PGP Key 
P1 5 Scaptain / tomorrowman 
P2 4 goingpostal / GoingPostal / GoingPostalGroup 
P3 4 BudBoss 
P4 4 northernconnect / northernconnection 
P5 3 BCBUDKING / BCBUDking 
P6 2 Tessellated / TessellatedMDMA 
P7 2 BudBoss 
P8 2 medicineman420 / medicine420 
P9 2 skeletor / MeGrimlock 
P10 1 goingpostal 
 
Table 4. Examples of vendor names associated with the same PGP key 
 
Some vendors, while using exactly the same name on the cryptomarkets they are active on, do 
not necessarily use the same public PGP key (10% of vendors are associated with two keys and 
1% with three keys). Consequently, this shows the importance of combining the analysis of 
vendor names and PGP keys to fully highlight distribution networks. 
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Vendor names 
Number of cryptomarkets 
where the same name is used 
Number of PGP keys  
used by the vendor 
BudBoss 6 2 
tomorrowman 5 2 
CanadianExpress 4 2 
MeGrimlock 3 2 
goingpostal 2 2 
medicineman420 2 2 
northernconnection 3 1 
GoingPostal 2 1 
BCBUDking 1 1 
GoingPostalGroup 1 1 
 
Table 5. Examples of vendor names associated with one or several PGP keys 
 
5. Organisation of the trafficking 
Figure 4 illustrates the proportions of illicit drugs vendors, linked through their names and/or 
public PGP keys, offer for sale. This analysis shows that some vendors are specialised in selling 
one category of illicit drug whatever the cryptomarkets where they are (see BudBoss and 
northernconnect/northernconnection, which manage 478 and 73 listings, respectively). The 
difference of vendor’s behaviour according to marketplace is also revealed by such analysis. 
Straightbiz (25 listings) only proposes two types of illicit drugs. Nevertheless, he focuses on 
selling psychedelics on Agora and stimulants on Evolution. The distribution networks 
respectively composed of Scaptain/tomorrowman (107 listings) and 
goingpostal/GoingPostal/GoingPostalGroup (294 listings) propose a wide range of illicit drugs 
and are present on several marketplaces (on Evolution, GoingPostal and GoingPostalGroup are 
associated with the same public PGP key). Therefore, this raises questions on their ability to 
ensure their supply. Scaptain/tomorrowman do not propose all their products on the markets 
they are active on (for instance, opioids on Agora and Hydra; psychedelics on Hydra and 
Pandora). Differences are also observed when several sellers, part of the same distribution 
network, are active on the same cryptomarket. On Evolution, GoingPostalGroup proposes 
opioids, psychedelics and cannabis while another entity of the same distribution network mainly 
focuses on selling ecstasy and stimulants. Likewise, the two entities 
Tessellated/TessellatedMDMA, part of the same distribution network according to the analysis 
of their public PGP keys, do not propose the same types of illicit drugs in function of their seller 
accounts in accord with their statements on their vendor profiles. 
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Figure 4. Proportions of the types of illicit drugs offered for sale by some Canadian vendors (proportions are 
expressed in function of the percentage of the total number of illicit drug listings proposed by each vendor). 
Addendum 
A study of the quantity and price of the illicit drugs proposed by sellers may help to refine the 
description of the organisation of distribution networks. For instance, we may hypothesise on 
the type of purchasers targeted by sellers (i.e. consumers or dealers) as well as the role of sellers 
in the distribution chain. That would also be a relevant analysis to corroborate the importance 
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6. Conclusion 
This study investigates illicit drug trafficking from a Canadian perspective through the analysis 
of 3685 listings and 198 vendor profiles collected during two months on eight cryptomarkets.  
The contribution of Canadian vendors may be described to be low when considering the global 
illicit trade on Darknet. Nevertheless, they propose a wide range of products and can handle 
worldwide shipping. The results reveal the presence of key actors of the Canadian illicit drug 
trafficking. They are characterised by the number of listings they manage, the diversity in the 
types of products they offer for sale and the number of cryptomarkets they are active on. The 
combined analysis of vendor names and public PGP keys gives an insight into the structure of 
the trafficking and reveals the existence of distribution networks. It shows that vendors may be 
active on several cryptomarkets and may use similar or different usernames. Therefore, 
trafficking on Darknet is more structured than we thought after the analysis of usernames. 
Lastly, the study of the products sellers offer for sale illustrates that some of them dedicate part 
of their online accounts to the selling of specific types of illicit drugs, whether they are present 
on one or several cryptomarkets. Moreover, the products they offer depend on the marketplace 
where they sell. In a few words, distribution networks may manage different seller accounts, 
may be present on several cryptomarkets and may propose a wide range of illicit drugs. Thus, 
they are organised and structured to ensure an efficient trafficking.  
This research demonstrates that data available online help to better understand illicit drug 
trafficking on Darknet. Moreover, they enable to highlight the main actors and to draw 
hypotheses on the structure and distribution of the online market. Knowledge gathered through 
the analysis of this data is mandatory to design efficient policy for monitoring or repressive 
purposes. Indeed, the seizures of cryptomarkets along with the arrests of administrators by law 
enforcement authorities did not prove to be an efficient approach to disrupt trafficking on 
Darknet and to interrupt the development of this phenomenon. Yet, these data are virtual and 
uncertain, making the study of this phenomenon difficult. The contribution of the profiling of 
physical data may provide a better understanding of all the aspects of the illicit drug trading on 
cryptomarkets [16]. For instance, it may corroborate the structure of the distribution networks 
highlighted through the analysis of digital data [17]. 
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